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INTRODUCTION
The exploration (and exploitation) of space has 
resulted in many technological advances for 
humanity in areas such as materials, naviga-
tion, telecommunications, medicine and many 
others. Improving the capabilities of space 
technologies, in order to increase the benefits 
that the utilization of space can offer, is a ma-
jor goal of all space faring nations. Since the 
Apollo age, the space sector has concentrated 
mainly on a conservative method of technology 
development, focusing on low risk incremental 
innovations, rather than breakthrough, radical 
or disruptive innovations (Summerer, 2009). 
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ABSTRACT
The	theory	of	Disruptive	Technologies	explains	the	evolution	of	technologies	that	disturb	the	status	quo	of	
both	dominant	technology	platforms	and	competitive	market	layouts.	In	this	paper,	the	theory	of	Disruptive	
Technologies	for	the	space	sector	is	explored.	This	exploration	is	required	because	the	Disruptive	Technology	
theory	is	currently	based	upon	the	innovation	dynamics	of	mass	consumer	markets,	which	are	significantly	
different	from	the	dynamics	of	the	low	volume,	highly	governmentally	influenced	space	sector.	The	objective	is	
to	clarify	the	dynamics	of	innovation	in	space	(with	particular	respect	to	technological	disruptions)	in	order	
to	help	decision	makers	in	their	effort	to	support	innovation	in	the	development	of	space	technologies.	This	is	
done	by	analyzing	the	dynamics	of	the	space	sector	and	the	theory	of	Disruptive	Technologies	in	respect	to	its	
applicability	to	the	space	sector.	The	result	of	these	analyses	leads	to	the	creation	of	a	theory	that	is	tailored	to	
the	specific	innovation	dynamics	of	the	space	sector.	The	theory	is	termed	Disruptive	Space	Technologies.	Key	
element	of	this	theory	is	the	fact	that	Disruptive	Technologies	in	the	space	sector	focus	mainly	on	technology	
disruption	rather	than	market	disruption.
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One of the reasons for this situation is the fact 
that space technology requires long and costly 
development phases with strict performance and 
environmental requirements. Another reason 
that can justify this situation is the very high 
cost of space transportation. These two factors 
have resulted in very stringent quality and flight 
heritage requirements. This situation, in turn, 
has created a paradigm, where the usage of 
technologies with meager or non-existing flight 
heritage is discouraged and, consequently, new 
technologies do not gain flight heritage because 
they are not selected (Szajnfarber, Grindle, & 
Weigel, 2009). Despite the existence of several 
projects that are trying to bridge this valley	
of	 death within technology evolution, many 
technologies still end up in the dust bin after 
substantial investments. The valley of death is 
the gap of funding between basic technology 
development (push technology development up 
to Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 4/5) and 
application specific technology development 
(pull technology development after TRL 6/7). 
Because of the need to overcome the valley of 
death, there is a clear requirement for an early 
stage identification of technologies that could 
significantly improve the capabilities of space 
applications by disrupting the state-of-the-art. 
This early stage identification leads to the 
nurturing and protection of the right technolo-
gies against the valley of death and a resulting 
improvement of the capabilities of the space 
sector. This identification of potential high-
gain technologies can be achieved by mapping 
the factors that determine and influence the 
market potential of a technology. The most 
successful technologies will be disruptive to 
the state-of-the-art of space technologies and 
will therefore be called Disruptive	Space	Tech-
nologies (DSTs).
The aim of this paper is to create an under-
standing of the underlying processes that govern 
technology disruptions in the space sector. This 
understanding allows for an adaptation of the 
theory of Disruptive	Technologies (DTs) to the 
unique market dynamics of the space sector. 
To gain this understanding, first the theory of 
DTs is subjected to a critical review. Different 
aspects of this theory are examined and evalu-
ated with respect to their applicability to the 
unique market dynamics of the space sector. A 
new concept for evaluating technologies using a 
mix of performance attributes is also introduced 
here. Second, an analysis of the space sector 
is conducted. The factors that differentiate the 
space sector from conventional, terrestrial mar-
kets are discussed and the peculiarities of the 
space sector are explored. Third, the process of 
disruption in the space sector is investigated by 
analyzing a number of technologies that have 
been disruptive to the space sector in the past. 
The analysis of past DT’s and their predeces-
sors is done by using a mix of performance 
attributes for each technology, which is then 
evaluated by experts of the field. This leads to 
an insight into technology developments and 
disruptions in the space sector.
The research presented here was conducted 
at the German Aerospace Center in Bremen in 
cooperation with the European Space Agency 
(ESA) within the framework of a DLR project 
supported by ESA (Contract 4000101810/10/
NL/GLC).
Theory of Disruptive Technologies
Over the last few years the term Disruptive 
Technology (DT) has become a buzzword in 
several organizations around the world. The 
term, first explained by Bower and Christensen 
(1995), describes a technology that emerges out 
of a niche market and becomes so dominant 
that it disrupts the status quo of a market and 
often leads to incumbent companies being 
pushed out of the market. A new technology 
is classified disruptive when, in addition to 
serving a niche market, it starts to appeal to the 
majority of customers in the mainstream market. 
Christensen, Anthony, and Roth (2004) call 
this process “low-end disruption”. This event 
occurs because the DT, through incremental 
technology improvements, starts to deliver the 
same (or better) performance than the previously 
dominant technology while also having addi-
tional attribute(s) that are valued by the niche 
market. When this happens, the new technology 
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rapidly becomes the new standard and the old 
technology, and the companies that exploited 
it, are pushed out of the market.
A DT is an exemption to the incremental/
radical innovations paradigm, which Chris-
tensen (1997) classifies as sustaining innova-
tions, because companies marketing these 
incremental/radical innovations continue to 
serve the same customers with the intention 
of sustaining their position in the market. The 
opposite of these sustaining innovations are 
DTs, which are technologies that disrupt the 
market of existing technologies exploited by 
incumbent companies. In practical terms this 
means that incumbent companies exploiting 
a dominant technology are being disrupted 
by new entrants exploiting a new technology 
(Carayannopoulos, 2009; Tellis, 2006).
Examples of incumbents disrupted by 
new entrants are illustrated in Table 1. Table 1 
shows the dominant technology, the Disruptive 
Technology introduced by a new entrant, the 
disruptive attribute that constitutes the biggest 
source of change in the perceived customer 
value and therefore sparked the disruption and 
the period of disruption.
Companies marketing technologies attempt 
to satisfy customer demand. The demand or 
requirements for technology performance dif-
fer with every customer. In marketing literature 
this heterogeneity in customer demand is called 
customer-perceived value (Yang & Peterson, 
2004). In innovation management literature, 
this customer-perceived value has been used 
as a basis to segment markets according to the 
customer’s assessment of the technologies 
performance dimensions. In this research, an 
attempt is made to determine the change in 
customer perceived value of a technology not 
on along a single performance attribute change 
(as addressed by the performance dimension 
by Christensen, 2007), or two attributes (as is 
popularized by the mapping of functional at-
tributes by Adner, 2002) but rather on a mix of 
performance attributes (e.g. cost, mass, effec-
tiveness, efficiency).
For this purpose, a concept under the term 
perceived	performance	mix is hereby introduced 
by the authors. It represents a mixture of the 
relevant performance attributes as perceived 
valuable by a customer or a part of the market. 
This leads to the following definition:
The	perceived	performance	mix	is	the	mix	of	
functional	 attributes	 of	 a	 technology	 as	 ap-
peared	valuable	to	the	customer.	
The alternate performance mix of a DT can 
fulfill a performance mix that is perceived as 
valuable by customers of the main market or by 
customers of a niche market. This can either be 
a push development (where a product is created 
to fulfill a performance mix not previously ad-
dressed) or a pull development (where a product 
is developed to meet the demand for a certain 
performance mix). Regardless whether the 
new product is developed from a push or a pull 
perspective, it starts disrupting an incumbents’ 
market. A further illustration of the concept of 
perceived performance is given by means of the 
example of portable music players:
Table	1.	Examples	of	DTs	
Dominant Technology 
(Incumbent)
Disruptive Technology (New 
Entrant)
Disruptive Attribute
Period of 
Disruption
Workstation Personal computer Affordability 1980’s
5.25 inch disk drive 3.5 inch disk drive Size, weight (laptops) 1980’s
Compact Cassette Compact Disc Sound quality, capacity 1990’s
Chemical photography Digital photography Capacity, development cost 2000’s
Discman Mp3 player Portability, capacity 2000’s
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The music industry has been a platform 
for several disruptions over the last decades. 
Changing sound recording formats, due to 
advancements in technology, have led to the 
development of a variety of portable music play-
ers to support each format. With the introduction 
of portable mp3 players to the market in the 
late 1990s, the Discman (portable CD-player) 
market has undergone a significant disruption 
(Beaudry, 2007). This disruption was primarily 
owed to the change of how the customers valued 
certain performance attributes. Figure 1 illus-
trates this change with the help of a radar chart. 
The image shows the performance attribute mix 
as it was before and after the introduction of 
mp3 players. Sound quality used to be valued 
most by the customers since this was the main 
advantage that the CD had over the cassette. 
Additionally, battery life and exchangeability of 
medium were very important. With the introduc-
tion of the mp3 format, however, this changed 
dramatically. Sound quality had reached a 
level where improvements would not have led 
to noticeable differences and battery life had 
become sufficient for extensive use. The result 
was that customers started focusing more on 
other attributes like capacity, exchange of music 
over the internet and portability. This ultimately 
led to a disruption of both the Discman as the 
dominant portable music player platform and 
well as a failure of the next generation sustain-
able innovation of the Minidisc player.
This shift in the value of products as per-
ceived by customers is a gradual process over 
time, is influenced by external factors. Examples 
of external factors would be a reach of basic 
functionality or functional threshold after which 
customers become ambiguous to any further 
improvements. This saturation of customer 
demand leads to a refocusing of technical per-
formance to secondary performance measures 
such as aesthetics, functionality and cost. This 
change in perceived value of a product is es-
sential for understanding of this concept and 
for Disruptive Technologies in general, as it is 
often the alternate performance mix that appeals 
to the customers and thus making the technol-
ogy disruptive and not one single performance 
attribute. This can be very well seen in the 
example of the Discman: despite the fact that 
the sound quality of the CD is vastly superior 
to the mp3 (Meyer, 2000), Discmans reached 
a point of sound quality that was satisfying 
enough for the mainstream customers. People 
consequently stopped valuing the performance 
mix of the CD and turned to the performance 
mix provided by the mp3 format, although 
inferior on some attributes. Because of the DT’s 
Figure	1.	Change	in	perceived	performance	mix	of	portable	music	players.	A	higher	score	means	
a	better	performance	on	this	attribute.	Data	comes	from	authors’	experience	and	serves	for	il-
lustration	purposes	only.
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initial inferiority and differences in the per-
ceived performance mix, incumbent companies 
are often blindsided and cannot see its potential. 
They believe that the new technology can only 
serve a niche market and that the majority of 
their customers will not value its use. In fact, 
it is often the customers themselves that tell the 
incumbents that they do not value the new 
features (Christensen, 1997). In conclusion, the 
latent customer needs of technologies are often 
the main source of disruptions.
The theory of technology displacements 
stems from the original concept of creative 
destruction by Schumpeter (1942). Over the 
years the concept evolved and different terms 
were added to the theory such as Technology 
Discontinuation & S-Curves (Foster, 1986), 
Radical, Incremental, Architectural & Modular 
Innovation (Henderson & Clark, 1990), Dis-
ruptive Technologies (Bower & Christensen, 
1995), Disruptive Innovation (Christensen 
& Raynor, 2003). A more elaborate history 
of the evolution of the theory of technology 
displacements can be found in Figure 2 (Yu 
& Hang, 2010). In recent years, the usage of 
the term Disruptive Technology has become 
highly ambiguous. Christensen himself added 
to the ambiguity of the term by proposing to 
rename DTs into Disruptive Innovations (DIs) 
(Christensen & Raynor, 2003). Christensen 
proposed this alteration to the theory because 
a market disruption has been found to be not 
a function of technology itself but rather of its 
changing application. By taking the example 
of the portable music players, it can be argued 
that not the MP3 player technology but rather 
the market enabled the technology to become 
disruptive. This alteration broadens the theory 
to encompass all innovations and not just tech-
nologies, which are defined as practical applica-
tions of scientific knowledge (products). This 
means that the theory encompasses now also 
disruptive innovations, thus including process, 
paradigm and position innovations. Markides 
(2006) states that broadening the concept is a 
mistake because different kinds of innovations 
have different competitive effects and produce 
different kinds of markets. The authors tend to 
agree to this point and are therefore continuing 
to use the term DTs especially since this article 
Figure	2.	Evolution	of	disruptive	technology/innovation	theory	with	the	addition	of	the	space	sector
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focusses solely on the disruption of technologies 
(products of the space sector). Like Markides, 
other researchers have also raised questions 
regarding the theory of DTs. Some of these 
questions are listed below:
• Is a technology inherently disruptive or 
does disruptiveness depends on the per-
spective of the firms confronted with the 
technical change? (Schmidt & Druehl, 
2008)
• How can the theory be used as a predictive 
tool? (Tellis, 2006)
• What is the exact definition of a DT? 
(Danneels, 2004)
• The theory names the creation of spin-offs 
as a solution to deal with DTs. What and 
when should this be done? (Danneels, 2004)
• When is a DT disrupting a dominant tech-
nology? (Danneels, 2004)
• Can the theory be used for creating instead 
of identifying DTs? (Yu & Hang, 2010)
These gaps in the theory have become 
known to the researchers working in this field 
and many have made attempts to fill them. 
Some examples are listed below:
• Paap and Katz (2004) utilize the theory 
of S-Curves as a method to model the 
underlying factors influencing disruptive 
innovations;
• Govindarajan and Kopalle (2005) propose 
a method to measure the disruptiveness of 
innovations;
• Christensen (2006) explains a method that 
can be used to recognize the next disruptive 
innovations on the horizon;
• Drew (2006) uses scenario planning meth-
ods to identify disruptive innovations at 
an early stage;
• Adner (2006) proposes a method to identify 
how the customers perceived performance 
changes as a technology evolves. This 
method is used as an indicator for new 
disruptive threats;
• Sainio and Puumalainen (2007) have de-
vised a method to measure the disruptive 
potential of a new technology;
• Sood and Tellis (2011) have created a model 
for understanding and predicting DTs;
• Chan Kim and Mauborgne (2005) have cre-
ated a method for identifying new-market 
disruptions.
Most researchers are focusing on the pre-
dictability of DTs as this would be the most 
beneficial to companies dealing with a potential 
disruption. However, thus far no consensus has 
been reached as to what a DT precisely is and 
as a logical effect, how it can be predicted. In 
fact, no evidence of any method that can ac-
curately identify or predict the course that a 
disruptive technology takes has been found to 
date. It seems that the theory is suffering from 
the fact that the spectrum of situations classified 
as disruptive is too broad as well as the fact that 
creating a unified theory capable of describing 
disruption in a range of markets with different 
market dynamics has proven difficult.
Because of this, researchers have begun to 
adapt the general theory of disruption to several 
specialized fields. The following fields have 
adopted a customized view of how DTs diffuse 
according to their unique market dynamics:
• Education (Christensen, Horn, & Johnson, 
2008);
• Medicine (Christensen, Grossman, & 
Hwang, 2009);
• Military (Mitchell, 2009);
• Gaming technology (Smith, 2007);
• Information technology (Peterson, Ander-
son, Culler, & Roscoe, 2003);
• Space (Summerer, 2009; Summerer, 2012; 
Veen, 2010).
To summarize the theory of DTs, several 
articles are used that provide a description of 
the theory. The main characteristics of a DT, 
according to Adner (2002), Gilbert (2003), 
30   International Journal of Space Technology Management and Innovation, 2(2), 24-39, July-December 2012
Copyright © 2012, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
Tripsas (2008) and Govindarajan and Kopalle 
(2005) are:
• DTs initially serve a different market 
segment than the dominant technology. 
Possible market segments are:
 ◦ A niche market (part of the market 
with different requirements);
 ◦ A low-end market (part of the market 
where customers have a lower willing-
ness to pay);
 ◦ A high-end market (part of the market 
where customers have a higher will-
ingness to pay);
 ◦ A fringe market (a market that is 
similar to the main market).
• At the moment of entrance into the market, 
DTs have a worse performance compared 
to the dominant technology in the main 
performance attribute(s). This leads to an 
under-appreciation by the incumbents of 
the technology, which effectively facilitates 
its entry into the market. When the DT starts 
maturing, however, it surpasses the domi-
nant technology in terms of performance 
by better fulfilling the customer needs. 
This happens because of its alternate mix 
of performance attributes.
From the aforementioned insights, the fol-
lowing working definition of a DT is derived:
A	disruptive	 technology	 is	a	 technology	 that	
alters	the	status	quo	of	both	the	market	position	
of	the	dominant	technology	and	the	competitive	
market	 layout	 by	 having	 an	 alternative	 per-
ceived	performance	mix,	which	is	valued	more	
by	the	customer	than	the	one	of	the	dominant	
technology.	
Space Sector Innovation
In the previous section, the general theory on 
DTs has been presented. In order to understand 
the mechanisms of market disruption in the 
space sector, as opposed to other technology 
sectors, an analysis of the space sector is exam-
ined by exploring specifics and peculiarities.
The space sector is a high-technology sec-
tor, which is instrumental in advancing a range 
of scientific fields (e.g. meteorology, astronomy, 
earth science, geodesy telemedicine). Due to 
research and development efforts and the result-
ing innovations, the technological capabilities 
of the space sector are steadily increasing. In 
practice, however, innovation in space is more 
frequently incremental upon the dominant 
technology and provides small improvements 
in the performance of a technology. According 
to Summerer (2009) this is partially caused by 
a risk-averse culture in the space sector, leav-
ing little room for the testing of innovations in 
subsystems that are not imperative for achieving 
mission success.
According to Tkatchova (2011), research 
and development and the diffusion of innova-
tions within the space sector are different when 
compared to terrestrial consumer markets. Space 
is an especially harsh environment, which is not 
only hard to reach but also hard for technologies 
to operate in. This creates unique constraints in 
the form of additional operational requirements 
that greatly exceed those required for terrestrial 
technologies. These operational requirements 
are determined by the following environmental 
constraints:
• High-energy radiation;
• Extreme temperatures;
• Large and frequent temperature variations;
• Micrometeoroid and orbital debris impacts;
• Vacuum environment;
• High g-forces during launch;
• Microgravity environment;
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• Limited opportunities for repairs or adjust-
ments after launch.
The constraints of the space environment 
have led to strict quality requirements for space 
technologies, since the failure of even a single 
component could potentially lead to a mission 
failure. In order to maintain a high degree of 
component reliability, the following measures 
are taken:
• Strict testing requirements;
• Proven space flight heritage requirements;
• High need for redundancy or diversity;
• Strict quality assurance and quality control 
processes.
An additional issue that is specifically 
relevant to space is the low volume demand 
for space technologies as compared to mass 
markets. This, combined with high launch costs 
and tight import/export and health regulations 
(e.g. International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(ITAR), Registration, Evaluation, Authori-
zations of Chemicals (REACH)), make the 
space sector an especially hard environment 
for start-ups.
Furthermore, an additional specific aspect 
of the space sector is that it is governed by market 
dynamics that are different from those of the 
mass consumer market. The market dynamics 
of the space sector are influenced by the actors 
and their interaction. In general, two types of 
customer-seller relationships exist with respect 
to technology development: the consumer and 
the governmental demand driven markets. In 
the first, the consumers’ needs are central and 
translate to specific technology requirements. 
In the second, governmental needs, which can 
be either militarily or scientifically driven, 
are central. This difference in customer-seller 
interaction means that the innovation dynamics 
in the scientific and military fields differ from 
those in the commercial field. In general, the 
following market forms can be identified:
• Mass market - Many sellers that face 
many buyers;
• Monopoly market - One seller that faces 
multiple buyers;
• Monopsony market - One buyer that faces 
multiple sellers;
• Oligopoly market - Few sellers that face 
multiple buyers;
• Oligopsony market - Few buyers that face 
multiple sellers.
The space sector in respect to science mis-
sions has been characterized as a monopsony 
market in which the government is the main 
investor in space related technologies (Szajn-
farber & Weigel, 2007; Summerer, 2012). It can 
be argues that the military has similar dynamics 
while to commercial market resemble more an 
Oligopolistic market structure.
Finally, there is one more difference be-
tween the space market and the general mass 
market. In the mass market, the product (or 
technology) is usually operated directly by 
the end user. For space technology, this is not 
necessarily true since, in general, most space 
technologies (for example functional telecom-
munications satellites) are operated by satellite 
operators who, in turn, sell their services to end 
users or service providers (Public Customers 
(PC) or Institutional Customers (IC) in Figure 3).
In the scenario of telecommunications 
satellites, the service providers are the real 
customers of the space technology (STC in 
Figure 3) and the space technology utilization 
is separated from the space technology develop-
ment. The result of this separation is one of the 
reasons for the barriers for adoption of new 
space technologies and the resulting slow evo-
lution of the space sectors’ capabilities.
Furthermore, it must be noted that space 
technology customers (especially within the 
telecommunication market) are generally not 
very motivated to bear the risk of testing and 
trying out a new technologies without an exter-
nal incentive since that results in higher costs 
thus lower profit margins. A much preferred 
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approach is to configure the space segment 
in a way that changes in performance can be 
delivered to the PC and the IC without the 
need of changes in the space hardware. This 
is particularly evident in the telecommunica-
tions sector where satellites can be seen, which 
were built more than 10 years ago, that are 
broadcasting the highly advanced signals of 
High Definition television (HDTV), although 
HDTV did not even exist when the satellites 
were developed (this has amongst others, been 
enabled by turbo coding).
At this point, it has been established that 
the space sector market structure and resulting 
innovation dynamics is significantly different 
from other high-technology sectors. This leads 
to a technology development process that is also 
different from other high technology sectors. 
These characteristics of technology develop-
ment within the space sector are elaborated next.
In the space sector, a distinction can be 
made between basic technology development 
and mission specific technology development. 
When looking through the so called technol-
ogy	 push and demand	 pull models, basic 
technology developments can be identified as 
the technology push factor, mission specific 
technology developments can be identified 
as the demand pull factor (Summerer, 2012). 
Especially technology push investments result 
in breakthrough technologies whereas demand 
pull investments result in more incremental 
innovations (Nemet, 2009; Carayannis & Roy, 
2000). This is primarily because technology 
push investments involve more fundamental 
research and application of novel materials 
whereas demand pull investments involve the 
improvement of existing technologies or de-
signs. Taking this into account, the technology 
push area of technology development may ap-
pear to be the most interesting when it comes to 
introducing DTs in the space sector. Therefore, 
in order to cultivate DTs in the space sector, it 
seems that technology push investments have 
to be increased. However, there are two main 
reasons why technology push investments in 
the space sector are impeded.
The first reason is that mature technologies 
are favored in the selection processes for tech-
nology development programs. This is because 
Figure	3.	Key	players	in	the	space	technology	market
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the lion’s share of technology development in 
the space sector is undertaken in the frame of 
a mission development program (demand pull 
investments). Peculiarly, this creates an impend-
ing dead-lock of technological development, 
since a certain technology is only developed if it 
is considered to be mature enough for a mission. 
This problem is amplified by the fact missions 
are proposed only if the scientist involved con-
sider them as technologically feasible. In other 
words, large gaps between technological state-
of-the-art and technological mission demands 
are avoided (Szajnfarber, Grindle, & Weigel, 
2009). This can be a hindrance to innovation 
as only sufficiently ambitious technological 
demands really drive innovation (Szajnfarber, 
Stringfellow, & Weigel, 2010).
The second reason is that technologies 
need to be tested and eventually flight-proven. 
Flight-proving a technology is often the largest 
hurdle to take in any space technology devel-
opment program. This is a direct result of the 
risk-averse nature of the space sector, which 
prevents non-conservative and innovative 
technologies to be tested and flight-proven on 
commercial telecommunications and navigation 
missions. In fact, not being able to properly test 
and subsequently flight-prove a technology is 
the main reason why a significant amount of 
technologies never reach full maturity.
The situation is, however, very different 
in the context of Science and Earth Observa-
tion missions. The customers of this part of 
the space sector are usually scientists, which 
have an ever increasing demand for new types 
of advanced space sensors. This need allows 
them to drive mission requirement to a point 
where using innovative less proven technologies 
can become an absolute imperative. This is in 
contrast to telecommunication satellite opera-
tors for whom the investment into new, risky 
technology does not prove to be economically 
viable. Because of this, Science and Earth Ob-
servation missions can be seen as the lead users 
for the space sector providing flight heritage to 
space technologies which can later be used for 
commercial satellites. Some examples of past 
DSTs which have been matured specifically 
for Science and Earth Observation missions at 
the European Space Agency are listed below:
• Goce: Drag compensation technology 
(Fehringer, Andre, Lamarre, & Maeusli, 
2008);
• Smos: Interferometric radiometry (Drink-
water, Kerr, Font, & Berger, 2008);
• Hershel: Silicon Carbide mirrors (Crone, 
Elfving, Passvogel, Pillbratt, & Tauber, 
2006);
• Gaia: Silicon Carbide structure (Douglas, 
et al., 2007; Gare, Sarri, & Schmidt, 2009).
Particularly interesting is the case of Silicon 
Carbide manufacturing that was first developed 
for a mirror application for Hershel, and was 
subsequently infused in Gaia, but for a differ-
ent application.
To further illustrate relevant aspects of 
technology development, and to get a better 
idea of how technology development in the 
space sector works, it is useful to analyze the 
diffusion of innovation within the space sector. 
A popular method of visualizing technology 
development within a certain technology sector 
is the hype cycle (Fenn & Raskino, 2008). This 
method, originally developed by Gartner, can be 
used to map the various upcoming and mature 
technologies in any technology sector or domain 
(Fenn & Raskino, 2008). As an example, a hype 
cycle with the various technologies within the 
propulsion and power domains of the space 
sector is displayed in Figure 4. Note that the 
graph does not display the technological ma-
turity, but rather the perception of the potential 
(expectation) for the technology.
In conclusion, it has been established that 
the space sector market structure and the result-
ing technology development process differs 
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significantly from other high-technology sec-
tors. This means that the characteristics of 
technology disruption have to be revised for 
the space sector in order to take into account 
these differences.
Theory of Disruptive 
Space Technologies
In the previous sections, the theory of DTs and 
the market dynamics of the space sector have 
been discussed. It was concluded that the space 
sector is sufficiently different from terrestrial 
consumer markets that a reassessment of the 
theory of DTs is required for the space sector. 
To better understand the impact, evolution 
and manifestation of DSTs and the path they 
take in replacing existing technologies, several 
technologies that have been disruptive to the 
space sector in the past have been analyzed. The 
analysis of these technologies shows that space 
technologies are highly subject to the percep-
tion of performance of a customer as it is the 
case with non-space technologies. The detailed 
analysis and the data used are too lengthy and 
exceed the scope of this paper and thus, only 
the results are presented here. Several examples 
of past disruptions are illustrated in Figure 5 
with the help of radar charts. The example of 
miniature satellites is chosen to illustrate low-
end encroachment within the space sector. These 
types of satellites are overall inferior in techni-
cal performance compared to regular satellites 
and it is solely the unique mix of performance 
attributes that these types of satellites offer 
(combination of functionality with low cost & 
low complexity) that appears valuable to cer-
tain customers. However, as determined in the 
section above, the customer-seller relationship 
within the space sector is significantly differ-
Figure	4.	Hype	cycle	of	the	space	sector.	Data	comes	from	authors’	experience	and	serves	for	
illustration	purposes	only.
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ent compared to the mass consumer market. 
Because of an increased customer power and 
the comparative small size of the space sector, 
following the disruption no major shifts were 
observable in the competitive market layout. 
This coincides with the standpoint on DT 
presented in Schmidt & Dreuhl (2008). Ac-
cording to this standpoint, the theory of DTs 
should relax the constraint that DTs have to be 
introduced by new entrants and focus less on the 
competitive market layout disruption and more 
on pure technology disruption. This standpoint 
has merit especially for the space sector where 
basic technology development is mostly the 
product of institutes and research groups.
The past DSTs share the common charac-
teristic of having a different mix of performance 
attributes compared to the dominant technolo-
Figure	5.	Performance	mixes	of	DST	(blue)	vs.	former	dominant	technology	(green)
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gies. This allowed them to first enter a niche 
market (for instance a specific scientific mis-
sion) before encroaching on the market of a 
dominant technology. Because of this, the 
scientific missions could be seen as the lead 
users of the space sector. While the over-per-
formance on a mix of performance attributes 
is a characteristic DSTs share with DTs, the 
following differences between the two can be 
observed:
• Development time: The development 
of a space technology takes a long time 
and, therefore, the response time of the 
incumbents to DSTs is high. They have the 
opportunity to either start a development 
process of their own (if the development 
time permits it) or take over the company 
marketing the new technology. Either way, 
the incumbents are unlikely to be pushed 
out of the market by a DST;
• Flight heritage: A dominant space tech-
nology already has a long flight heritage. 
A new space technology candidate must 
deliver a very significant improvement 
on the dominant technology to justify the 
increase in risk and cost when using the 
new space technology;
• Market characteristics: the space sector is 
a complex market that is highly influenced 
by governmental entities. Development 
and usage of a technology is often linked 
to political motives, national industrial 
policy, and other social aspects.
When analyzing innovation literature and 
the theory of DTs, a resemblance can be found 
between radical innovations and DSTs. Both are 
explorations of new technologies and replace 
dominant technologies. Additionally, they both 
offer a higher performance on the perceived 
performance mix compared to the dominant 
technology. The key difference between these 
theories is that DSTs do this in an unexpected 
way or, in other words, by over performing on 
an alternative performance mix, which is valued 
by customers of a niche market. This means 
that the disruption of technologies is mostly 
governed by market factors rather than tech-
nical performance superiority. It is the market 
Figure	6.	Aggregation	level	pyramid	with	respect	to	radical	innovation	within	the	space	sector.	
SoS	=	System	of	Systems
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that changes in an unexpected way and thereby 
facilitates the disruption of the state-of-the-art 
technology by a DST. The insights mentioned 
above lead to the following definition of a DST:
A	Disruptive	Space	Technology	 is	a	 technol-
ogy	 that	 radically	 changes	 the	 status	 quo	
of	 the	 space	 sector	by	having	an	alternative	
perceived	performance	mix,	which	fulfills	the	
user’s	technology	requirements	better	than	the	
dominant	technology.	
It is important to note that also many 
ambiguous terms have been used to classify 
disruptive, discontinuous or radical innovations 
within the space sector. For example, within 
the European space sector, the term Disrup-
tive Technologies is predominant while in the 
US the term Game	Changing	 Technology is 
prevalent. Additionally, the term Breakthrough	
Discoveries seems to be the leading term for 
basic technologies such as materials and fun-
damental physics. Because of this, it would 
be useful to have a structure of classification 
that fits the existing terminologies as close as 
possible. Such a structure of classification of 
technology replacement is proposed in Figure 6.
CONCLUSION
Since its conception, the space sector has 
relied heavily on governmental contributions 
for funding of technology developments. In 
this respect, the space sector is somewhat of 
a late bloomer seeing as other historical high 
tech industries such as the railroad industry, 
the terrestrial telecommunications industry, 
the aircraft industry and computer industry 
all required an initial government investment 
before it was feasible for commercialization to 
occur. The space sector has not gone through 
this commercialization process yet, but it is 
possible, if more is invested in the develop-
ment of technologies with a high disruptive 
potential. This would lead to a future where 
lower cost and higher performance increases 
the utilization of space for commercial ventures 
such as earth observation, telecommunication 
& navigation while possibly opening it up to 
new ventures such as space tourism, space 
based solar power and asteroid mining. This 
paper intends to contribute to the process of 
space innovation by helping decision makers 
with the identification of future DSTs.
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